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Between 1996 and 2006, Nepal experienced violent civil conflict as a consequence of a Maoist insurgency. This paper investigates the impact of being exposed to this insurgency at a young age on education outcomes. This study makes both an empirical and a methodological contribution to the growing literature on the impact of civil conflict on human capital formation. First, this paper extends our understanding of the impact of civil conflict on education to include a conflict of moderate intensity. With just over 13,000 casualties and less than 1 percent of the population forcibly displaced, the level of violence considered in this study was much lower than in conflict episodes considered in previous studies.
1 Second, two alternative identification strategies are employed to increase confidence in the reliability of the estimates: the first relies on variation in conflict exposure across birth cohorts and geographic areas in a single survey, as is standard in the literature (e.g., Akresh and de Walque 2008; Shemyakina 2011; Chamarbagwala and Morán 2011) , and the second relies on variation in exposure to conflict among school-aged individuals between household surveys and geographic areas.
Educational attainment is generally expected to be adversely affected by exposure to armed civil conflict. Direct youth enrollment in the military, limited mobility, and the destruction of schools may all negatively affect the ability of children to attend school. Increased poverty may drive parents to remove children from school (to avoid direct costs) and put them to work (to avoid opportunity costs). Political instability and reduced life expectancy may decrease expected returns to education and, in turn, reduce investments in human capital. Moreover, the schooling of girls is often more sensitive to worsening economic conditions than that of boys. A conflict environment may also hinder the functioning of education programs by weakening government institutions and imposing logistical and staff security challenges on local and international NGOs.
However, the general expectation that schooling is disrupted in conflict areas may not be well founded in the particular case of Nepal. National trends do not indicate an increase in poverty coinciding with the conflict but rather a steady decline in poverty (World Bank 2005) . Despite 3 difficulties with public service provision, basic health and education services have been maintained (Armon et al. 2004 ). In addition, the insurgency may have had a positive effect on schooling outcomes despite the fighting through both intended and unintended consequences of the Maoist presence. The insurgents have been reported to police teacher absenteeism (Hart 2001 ; see also
Collins 2006 and Devkota and van Teijlingen 2010, for a similar argument regarding health workers) and have explicitly opposed caste-and ethnicity-biased traditions; these actions may have directly benefited both male and female education. In addition, the insurgents have publicly opposed gender inequality, including gender inequality in access to schooling. For instance, it has been reported that "the Maoists have taken a strong stand on this issue -insisting that girls of school age attend the local facilities, even to the point of holding parents accountable and liable to punishment for the non-attendance of their daughters" (Hart 2001, p. 32) . Although the egalitarian rhetoric has not been followed completely in practice, a number of women were directly involved in combat, and there is anecdotal evidence of improved conditions for women in areas controlled by the Maoists, such as decreases in polygamy, domestic violence, and alcoholism (Lama-Tamang et al. 2003; Manchanda 2004; Geiser 2005; Aguirre and Pietropaoli 2008; Ariño 2008) . The diffusion of the egalitarian Maoist ideology may also have increased the aspirations of young girls for their own education and the aspirations of parents for their daughters' education. One unintended aspect of the insurgency may have contributed to improving schooling outcomes, especially for girls:
female labor force participation increased (Menon and Rodgers 2011) , and there is evidence that when women have more control over household expenditure investments in children increase, especially for girls (e.g., Thomas 1990; Duflo 2003) . Thus, in the case of Nepal, contrary to most episodes of violent conflict, the direction of the effect of the Maoist insurgency on schooling outcomes seems unclear a priori.
Nonetheless, one particular aspect of the Nepalese conflict is likely to have been unambiguously detrimental to education: the common insurgent practice of abducting civilians. Parents may have been deterred from sending their children to school out of fear that they would be abducted by the In this paper, I exploit differences in the intensity of violence experienced by individuals born at different times, surveyed at different times, and in different districts to shed light on the ways in which experiencing the insurgency at a young age affected educational outcomes.
Individual data from the 2001 and 2006 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) of Nepal are
merged with detailed conflict data collected by INSEC, namely, the number of conflict fatalities, school destructions, and abductions by Maoists at the district level.
I find that overall conflict intensity, as measured by conflict casualties, was associated with an increase in female educational attainment, whereas abductions by Maoists, which often targeted school children, had the reverse effect. Male schooling also tended to increase more rapidly in areas where the fighting was more intense, but the estimates are smaller in magnitude and more sensitive to specification. Similar results are obtained across different identification strategies, and robustness checks indicate that these findings are not due to selective migration.
In the next section, I review the existing evidence on the impact of armed conflict on education outside Nepal with an emphasis on male-female differences. I then present the Nepalese conflict in section II, the data in section III, the empirical strategy in section IV, and the estimation results in section V. Section VI concludes.
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I. <<A>>Literature Review A number of cross-country analyses suggest that political instability has large negative effects on growth but that recovery to equilibrium levels tends to be rapid (see Blattman and Miguel 2010, for a review). At the microeconomic level, the results of an emerging body of literature on the impact of war-related destruction or civil conflict on educational attainment show that violent conflict often leads to worse educational outcomes, but estimates vary substantially by conflict, gender, and educational level. Overall, girls in postprimary education appear to experience the worst effects.
In war-torn Germany and Austria, school-aged individuals exposed to war received fewer years of education (Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 2004; Akbulut-Yuksel 2009) . In Guatemala, where the worst period of the Guatemalan civil war saw nearly 200,000 deaths, Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011) find that individuals who were of schooling age in departments that were more affected by the war completed fewer years of schooling and that this effect was much more marked for girls. In
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Swee (2009) estimates that cohorts of children exposed to greater conflict intensity at the municipal level were less likely to complete secondary schooling, but primary schooling attainment was unaffected. Shemyakina (2011a) finds that girls (but not boys) who were of schooling age during the Tajik civil war were less likely to complete mandatory schooling in areas severely affected by conflict events. Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) find that in Colombia, children aged 12 years and older who were exposed to more violence at the municipal level were more likely to drop out of school and enter the labor market. León (2012) finds that individuals who were born and raised in Peruvian districts that were more affected by conflict-related violence completed fewer years of education. Three recent papers, one by Akresh and de Walque (2008) and two by Annan, Blattman, and colleagues (Annan et al. 2009; Blattman and Annan 2010) , illustrate the marked heterogeneity in findings on the impact of civil conflict across demographic groups and across conflicts. Akresh and de Walque (2008) estimate that cohorts of children exposed to the extremely violent Rwandan genocide, which killed 10 percent of the country's population, 6 completed 18.3 percent fewer years of education. However, contrary to results from Guatemala, for example (Chamarbagwala and Morán 2011) , they find that due to the nature of the conflict, nonpoor, male individuals were more negatively affected. Studying the effect of forced recruitment into the Ugandan Lord's Liberation Army, Annan et al. (2009) and Blattman and Annan (2010) find dramatically different effects for men and for women in the opposite direction of those obtained by, for example, Shemyakina (2011a) and Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011) . The abducted men in their sample, who were abducted, on average, for just over 15 months, experienced much worse educational attainment and labor market outcomes as well as poorer psychological health (Blattman and Annan 2010) . However, these authors find no such effects for female abductees, which they attribute to the lack of opportunities for women in general (Annan et al. 2009 ).
II. <<A>>Conflict in Nepal
Nepal was an absolute monarchy until 1990. Despite multiparty democratic elections in 1991, a Maoist presence varied from sporadic attacks to the organization of local governments and law courts. Over the course of the conflict, Maoists attacked government targets, such as army barracks, police posts, and local government buildings (Do and Iyer 2010) . They were also reported to terrorize, loot, abduct, and physically assault civilians (Bohara et al. 2006) . However, government security forces also killed civilians and were accused of using children for spying, torturing, displacing, and summarily convicting civilians (Bohara et al. 2006 ).
The principal objective of the insurgents was the creation of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. Other important stated aims were land redistribution and equality for all castes, language groups, and women.
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A crucial moment in the conflict was the Maoists' abandonment of a short-lived cease fire in November 2001. From that point, the government's response intensified dramatically, involving the Royal Nepal Army and leading to an escalation of violence (see figure S1 in the supplemental appendix, available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/). Building on opposition to King Gyanendra's authoritative reaction to the prolonged conflict, the Maoists joined forces with some of the country's major political parties, leading to the signing of a peace agreement in November 2006 and the creation of an interim government led by a power-sharing coalition that included the Maoists.
The intensity of conflict varied substantially across the districts of Nepal, as illustrated in figure   1 , which depicts the distribution of districts between the three terciles of conflict deaths per 1,000
inhabitants. One specific characteristic of the Nepalese conflict that is likely to be particularly relevant for an analysis of educational outcomes is the insurgents' practice of abducting civilians, particularly school children, en masse for short periods of intensive indoctrination. As illustrated by figure S2 , there is a positive correlation between the number of abductions by Maoists and the intensity of fighting as measured by conflict-related casualties, but the relationship is not systematic. Hence, it is possible to consider the effect of abductions over and above that of overall conflict intensity. 2 Districts with the highest proportion of abductees among the population are found in the middle tercile, which may be due to a lesser need for indoctrination in Maoist strongholds. 3 Districts in the top quartile of the distribution of abductions per 1,000 inhabitants that are not also in the top quartile of the distribution of casualties per 1,000 inhabitants tend to be found at the far western or eastern borders, close to districts characterized by intense fighting (i.e., numerous casualties).
Several arguments have been advanced to explain the district variation in the intensity of the insurgency, including geography (Murshed and Gates 2005; Bohara et al. 2006; Do and Iyer 2010) , poverty (Murshed and Gates 2004; Do and Iyer 2010) , a lack of political participation (Bohara et al. 2006) , and intergroup inequality (Murshed and Gates 2005; Macours 2011 and district. In its simplest form, the estimating equation can be written as follows:
where is, in turn, a dummy variable equal to one if individual i in district j born in year t has completed primary education and zero otherwise or the number of years of education completed by this individual; represents district fixed effects; represents birth year dummies; and is the interaction between a dummy equal to one when the individual belongs to the treated cohort and the number of conflict casualties (per 1,000 inhabitants) in district j during 1996-2006. In the baseline regressions, I define the treated cohort as those aged 5 to 9 years at the beginning of the conflict in 1996, whereas the control cohort includes individuals aged 16 to 19 years at the beginning of the conflict. This choice is discussed in the preliminary analysis at the end of this section.
Under the assumption that there is no correlation between the number of district casualties and unobserved factors varying with district and birth cohort, β is the causal effect of a one-unit increase in on the primary completion rate or on the number of years of education completed by exposed cohorts. A one-unit increase in roughly corresponds to one standard deviation in the district-level distribution of casualties (0.98). Another way of appraising the magnitude of β is to consider a one-unit increase in as a move from the district with the least conflict to the 53rd district (out of 75) in order of conflict intensity or from the 53rd district to the 69th district in order of conflict intensity-a very large increase in conflict intensity.
There are five "developmental regions" in Nepal, which are relatively homogeneous in terms of their level of development (see figure 1 ). In equation (1), I implicitly restrict birth cohort effects 13 ( ) to be identical across development regions. To reduce the potential for unobserved cohortdistrict varying factors to bias the estimate of the effect of conflict exposure, in the main set of results, I report estimates of equation (1R) in which the birth year intercepts are allowed to vary by development region ( ). 7 Here, the effect of conflict is identified by using the difference in exposure to conflict by district and birth year cohort, net of birth year trends common to all districts within a given development region:
In addition, I estimate variants of equation (1) It would be desirable to control for the socioeconomic status of the household in which an individual was raised. However, household characteristics are not included as regressors in this specification because these are only observed at the time of the survey in 2006, 10 years after the beginning of exposure to conflict, and may therefore be caused by the conflict. In addition, at the time of the survey, individuals in the control group were 25-28 years old, and members of the treated group were 14-18 years old. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine household characteristics that would not depend on the individual's education level at the time of the survey. In the second identification strategy described below, I observe school-aged children in their household; hence, I
can control for household characteristics. estimate the following:
where is the primary education completion dummy or the number of completed years of education of individual i in district j observed in survey year s, represents district fixed effects, is a survey dummy equal to one for DHS 2006 and zero for DHS 2001, is the number of conflict deaths per 1,000 inhabitants that occurred in district j in year y, and is the number of conflict deaths per 1,000 inhabitants in district j that occurred between the individual's birth year and survey year s in which the individual is interviewed, which I calculate from yearly district death counts. When is the primary education indicator, the sample comprises 15 children aged 10-18 years, who may have completed primary education at the time of the survey.
When is the number of years of education completed, the sample comprises children aged 5-14 years, who are of primary school age at the time of the survey. Under the assumption that there is no correlation between the cumulative number of district casualties between 1996 and year s and unobserved district-survey-varying factors, is the causal effect of a one-unit increase in on the rate of primary schooling completion (the number of years of education completed) by the 10-to 18-year-old (5-to 14-year old) group. The magnitude of can be directly compared to that of β because both and are expressed in district casualties per 1,000 inhabitants.
is a set of controls that contains age at interview dummies and their interaction with the survey dummy in all specifications, thus allowing the educational attainment of each age group to vary independently between the two surveys. 
This second identification strategy has three important advantages compared to the traditional approach based on variation in exposure by birth cohort and district for individuals observed at a single point in time. First, it has the advantage of comparing cohorts that are born only five years apart but have experienced very different degrees of conflict (i.e., a 10-year-old in 2001 in district j was exposed to much less conflict than a 10-year-old in 2006 in district j but was born only five years earlier), which reduces concerns regarding potential confounders, including differential migration patterns. Second, when the sample is restricted to children aged 14 years and under, the concern regarding selection bias due to voluntary migration decreases because most migrants are men aged 15-44 years, who typically leave their wives and children behind (Lokshin and Glinskaya 2009 All specifications are estimated using linear district fixed-effects panel data models. All models allow for error terms to be correlated in an arbitrary fashion within a district to avoid overrejection of the null hypothesis of zero treatment effect due to serial correlation, following Bertrand et al. (2004) .
<<B>>Preliminary Analysis
An inspection of the data shows that although the legally mandated age for beginning schooling is six years old and there are five years of primary schooling, a sizeable proportion of children are enrolled in primary school before age six (70.1 percent at five years) and until age 14 (16.1 percent)
in the 2006 DHS, with numbers subsequently decreasing sharply (7.9 percent at 15 years and 2.85 percent at 16 years). 10 Therefore, an analysis of the long-term effect of conflict on primary schooling completion should consider children aged at least 14 years at the time of the survey, and control cohorts should have been at least 15 years at the beginning of the conflict (and preferably 17 slightly older). When estimating variants of equation (1), I therefore define the treated cohort as comprising individuals aged five to nine years at the beginning of the conflict in 1996, such that all treated cohorts are exposed to the conflict during most of their potential primary schooling careers and the youngest exposed cohort is observed at age 14 in the 2006 DHS. In the main regressions, the control cohorts include individuals aged 16 to 19 years at the beginning of the conflict-that is, individuals who were born too early to have their primary education affected by the conflict but are as close, and therefore as comparable, to the treated cohorts as possible. I also provide a robustness check in which the control group comprises individuals aged 18-25 years at the start of the conflict.
In the baseline specification, I exclude cohorts aged 10 to 15 years in 1996 because the treatment status of these cohorts is less clear. Many of these individuals could have been enrolled in primary schooling during the conflict, but they were not exposed to conflict during most of their primary schooling careers (see figures S3a and S3b).
Panel A of table 1 illustrates the basic identification strategy used in the baseline specification.
This panel shows the difference in the increase in primary schooling between cohorts exposed (row (1)) and not exposed (row (2)) to conflict during their primary schooling careers in districts experiencing above-median conflict casualties (columns (1) and (4)) compared to districts experiencing below-median conflict casualties (columns (2) and (5)). Women born too early to be affected by the conflict during their primary schooling years have a much lower rate of primary schooling in high-conflict districts compared to women in low-conflict districts. In contrast, primary schooling completion is slightly higher in high-conflict districts compared to low-conflict districts among the cohort of women who were entering primary school around the beginning of the conflict, resulting in an additional increase in female primary schooling of 19 percentage points between the two cohorts in high-conflict areas compared to low-conflict areas. A qualitatively similar but less dramatic effect is observed among men.
To shed light on the direction of the potential biases due to differential preconflict trends, I
conduct several control or "placebo" experiments in which conflict exposure is artificially assigned 18 to cohorts who were too old to be affected by the conflict. In panel C, the experiment is conducted by replacing the below-and above-median casualty categories with below-and above-median Maoist abduction categories. The results in panel C show that primary schooling has progressed more rapidly in districts with above-median Maoist abductions. However, two-thirds of districts classified as high (low) conflict based on the median number of casualties are also classified as high (low) conflict based on the median number of abductions. Therefore, these simple two-by-two calculations may capture the effect of overall conflict intensity, the effect of Maoist abductions, or both. In the regressions that follow, I
disentangle the effect of overall conflict intensity and Maoist abductions by including both conflict variables.
Panels D1 and D2 show results for tests that replicate the placebo tests for panels B1 and B2, where the definition of high-and low-conflict districts based on above-and below-median conflict casualties is replaced with the definition based on above-and below-median district abductions.
Females experienced similar preconflict primary education trends in high-and low-abduction districts. Male cohorts found in high-abduction districts experienced slower progress in preconflict primary education relative to low-abduction districts. If the same trends continued for cohorts considered in the experiment of interest, then the effect of exposure to Maoist abductions would tend to be biased downward for males (i.e., to be more negative) but not for females. On the contrary, in the regression analysis, I find that after controlling for district casualties, the education of females suffered from Maoist abductions, but that the education of males did not. Therefore, the difference in male trends observed in panels D1 and D2 does not drive my conclusions.
V. <<A>>Results
The preliminary analysis in section IV suggested that primary schooling completion rates tended to increase more rapidly during armed conflict in areas that experienced a high intensity of conflict, especially for girls. In tables 2 to 4, I present estimates of the impact of exposure to conflict on educational outcomes to determine whether this striking conclusion of the preliminary analysis is confirmed when using more detailed information on the intensity of conflict, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity between individual districts and between regions over time and using different identification strategies. Table 2 reports findings on the impact of conflict exposure on primary schooling completion.
The first two columns present estimates of the long-term effect of conflict intensity on primary schooling completion using the baseline specification (equation ( The results in the first column indicate that areas with more fighting witnessed a larger increase in female primary education attainment. Casting this result in terms of the distribution of conflict violence, an increase in violence of one standard deviation of the district-level distribution of casualties during the conflict (0.98 casualties per 1,000 inhabitants) increases female primary schooling attainment by 5.6 percentage points. This is roughly the effect of a move from the 5th to the 75th percentile of the district-level conflict distribution of total casualties. The sign and order of magnitude of this effect is confirmed when comparing cohorts born only five years apart but exposed to very different levels of conflict using equation (2R). Across all specifications in table 2, conflict exposure does not appear to significantly affect male primary schooling completion, although the gender difference in the conflict effect is only statistically significant in columns (3) to (6).
These results are robust to including controls for household characteristics, suggesting that the results are not driven by a change in household composition due to, for example, selective mortality or migration (columns (5) and (6)). Table S2 presents specifications similar to those in table 2 but replaces the indicator for primary schooling completion with years of education completed. Similar results are obtained, indicating that an increase in violence of one standard deviation increases female educational attainment by 0.6 years. districts experiencing more casualties and that this effect was more robust across specifications for females.
Next, I investigate whether specific aspects of the conflict had different effects on primary schooling completion (table 3) . First, I use INSEC data on the total number of school destructions per district to test whether these destructions had a negative effect on primary schooling completion despite the overall positive impact of the insurgency (columns (1) and (2)). For both genders, I find a statistically insignificant effect, which is likely because a district-level analysis lacks the power to identify the effect of school destructions. School destructions were a rare and isolated aspect of the conflict 11 that could be expected to have had a large effect on schooling at a disaggregated level but not at the district level. Second, I use INSEC data on the total number of abductions by Maoists per district to test whether a larger number of abductions, often targeting school children, had an adverse effect on schooling. The results in columns (3) and (4) indicate that abductions had a negative effect on female primary schooling. An increase in the number of abductions (per 1,000 inhabitants) by one standard deviation of the district-level distribution (16.82) decreases female primary schooling attainment by 3.7 percentage points. In other words, the effect of a move from the 5th to the 75th percentile of the district-level distribution of total abductions yields a 1.6 percentage point decline in female primary completion. Third, I test whether primary schooling completion improved more in districts controlled by Maoists where the insurgents were better able to affect schooling provision according to their ideology (columns (5) to (8)). There is no clear-cut definition of insurgent control, with discrepancies between the classifications used by the People's Army and the government (Hatlebakk 2007) . Therefore, I use two alternative classifications. The choice of definition affects the magnitude and significance of estimates, but the overall message is that primary schooling has tended to become more prevalent over time for both genders in areas controlled by the Maoists. Tables S4 and S5 replicate the analysis in table 3 with birth year fixed effects restricted to be identical across development regions of Nepal (tables S4 and S5) and the control cohort replaced 22 with individuals aged 18-24 years at the beginning of the conflict ( (2R)).
Column (1) sample to children whose mothers had not moved since 1996 (columns (3) and (4)), which confirms that changes in composition due to migration patterns are not driving these findings. In table S6, I repeat the analysis in table 4 but restrict the age intercepts and survey year dummy to be identical across Nepal's development regions. The results for the female sample are almost identical, but estimates for the male sample are now nearly as large as those for the female sample and are statistically significant. Echoing the findings for primary schooling completion, overall, these results confirm that primary education progressed more rapidly during the conflict in districts that experienced more casualties, and this effect is more robust across specifications for females.
In conclusion, the results presented in this section provide no support for the hypothesis that the Nepalese civil conflict had a negative effect on schooling overall. There is a robust positive effect of the intensity of the insurgency on female educational attainment, but there is less of an effect for male educational attainment. There is also evidence of a decrease in female primary schooling completion where insurgents were more prone to abductions, holding overall conflict intensity constant.
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VI. <<A>>Concluding Remarks
Despite experiencing a substantial civil conflict between 1996 and 2006, Nepal has surprisingly enjoyed one of the best periods in its history in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction. At present, however, little is known about whether this period of development at the aggregate level hides disparities at a more disaggregated level due to the wide variation in conflict intensity across the country.
In this paper, I exploit variation in exposure to conflict by birth cohort, survey date, and district to estimate the impact of conflict intensity on schooling outcomes.
I find no support for the hypothesis that civil-conflict-related violence, as measured by the number of conflict casualties, had a negative effect on the quantity of schooling attained by children of either gender. On the contrary, there is robust evidence that female primary schooling attainment increased in districts that experienced more conflict deaths relative to districts with fewer conflict deaths. This result holds irrespective of whether one compares (within a given district) (i) the completion of primary education for cohorts exposed and not exposed to the conflict and observed at the end of the conflict or (ii) years of education completed by a given age for cohorts observed before (2001) and after (2006) a sharp escalation of the conflict and that were therefore exposed to very different degrees of conflict. It is also robust to a number of changes in specifications. In particular, robustness checks indicate that changes in household composition due to conflictinduced migration patterns do not drive this finding.
However, one aspect of the Nepalese civil conflict that is particularly relevant to schooling outcomes had adverse consequences on female primary schooling: the widespread insurgent practice of abducting civilians, many of whom were school children. From an international perspective, this paper contributes to unpacking the complexity that lies behind the generic term civil conflict. The idiosyncrasies of each conflict highlight the need for additional research on the impacts of different conflicts to shed light on the range of potential effects rather than a focus on extreme, but thankfully rare, instances.
From a policy perspective, the present findings call for measures that aim to protect school children and teachers from being directly targeted by combatants. As shown in this paper, even where primary education systems appear very resilient to surrounding violence, direct targeting of schools, however mild (e.g., brief abductions of pupils and teachers for indoctrination purposes), has adverse effects on schooling, especially for girls. Note: District casualties are expressed per 1,000 inhabitants. "High" and "low" refer to above-median or below-median district totals per 1,000 inhabitants. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. All first differences (i.e., row (1) -row (2) for a given conflict category) are statistically significant, except for values marked with -. DiD indicates difference-in-difference. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (4), the 2006 sample is restricted to individuals whose mothers were interviewed individually and whose mothers reported having lived in their current place of residence as of 1996. The same exclusion could not be implemented for the 2001 DHS because individuals listed on the household roster cannot be matched to their mothers. a DHS data collection was somewhat affected by the conflict in 2001. Hence, contrary to DHS 2006, four districts were not covered: Dolpa, Jajarkot, Rolpa, and Rukhum. The small districts of Manang and Mustang were not surveyed, but these districts did not experience any casualties during the conflict. b value of an F test of equality between the reported treatment effects for males and females. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 The samples in Columns (5) and (6) are slightly smaller compared to Columns (1) and (2) because the natural logarithm of conflict casualties is undefined for observations from the small districts of Manang and Mustang, where there were no conflict casualties. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. a DHS data collection was somewhat affected by the conflict in 2001, and so contrary to DHS 2006 four districts were not covered, namely Dolpa, Jajarkot, Rolpa and Rukhum. The small districts of Manang and Mustang were not surveyed either, but these districts did not experience any casualty during the conflict. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Figure 
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